Do hedge funds time market tail risk? Evidence from option-implied tail risk

This paper focuses on an unexplored dimension of fund managers’ timing ability: Market-wide tail risk implied by information in options markets. Constructing the option-implied tail risk, we investigate whether hedge fund managers can strategically time the tail risk through adjusting their exposure to changes of it. Using an extensive sample of equity-oriented hedge funds, we find strong evidence of tail risk timing ability of hedge fund managers. Furthermore, tail risk timing ability brings significant economic value to investors. Top-ranked funds outperform bottom-ranked funds by 5–7% annually after adjusting for risk factors. Our results are robust to various robustness checks.     

Unobserved ties between corporate executives and mutual fund managers

After corporate executives relocate from origin firms to destination firms, only 3.6 percent of mutual fund managers follow the departing executives: they divest from origin firms while initiating investments in destination firms. This phenomenon is more pronounced for those funds that earned superior returns from investments in the origin firms, and that demand more information regarding the destination firms. Further, comigration funds’ holding changes in destination firms more accurately predict cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements than do their investments in other stocks and non‐comigration funds’ new investments. Hiring the migrating executives does not improve the destination firms’ operating performance.     

Measuring the deadly embrace: Systemic and sovereign risks

This study contributes to the literature by making a first step toward implementing a comprehensive internally coherent measurement of systemic risk in a country. It measures systemic risk and the ensuing conditional contingent liabilities of the sovereign stemming from Luxembourg’s Other Systemically Important Institutions (OSIIs), the Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) to which they belong, the investment funds sponsored by the OSIIs, the household and the non-financial corporate sectors. The ensuing estimated systemic contingent claims are included in a stochastic version of the general government’s balance sheet to gauge their impact on the country’s sovereign risk. Results indicate that time-varying conditional implicit guarantees from OSSIs are larger than those from G-SIBs and investment funds, while systemic risk stemming from the household and non-financial corporate sectors is moderate. The robustness of the sovereign is not drastically affected by systemic risk stemming from the rest of the economy. However, illustrating the so-called “deadly embrace”, sovereign risk would significantly rise as a result of a historically plausible increase in sovereign assets’ value volatility combined with an economy-wide shock. The main policy implication is that financial stability stands on two columns, a resilient financial sector and a sustainable fiscal position.     

Do mutual fund flows affect the French corporate bond market?

We study whether investors’ withdrawals from mutual funds affect corporate bond prices. As mutual funds have become major players in the financial markets, they are likely to exert downward pressures on asset prices when facing investors’ redemptions, particularly in the less liquid markets such as corporate bonds. We use a novel dataset on the French bond funds and show that both flows in and out of mutual funds lead to a significant effect on the corporate bond yields. This effect is asymmetric as redemptions provoke a change in yields of greater magnitude than inflows. Moreover, all corporate bonds are not equally affected by investors’ withdrawals from funds: The more a bond is detained by funds, the higher the impact of redemptions on its yield. These three results are robust to various changes in econometric specifications.     

Equally Weighted Strategic Allocation and Balanced Funds in Brazil

This article analyzes equally weighted strategic asset allocation portfolios in Brazil between 2004 and 2016 and shows that their average returns are not always statistically greater than those of balanced funds, with significance changing in sub-periods. Fixed-income portfolios frequently outperform balanced funds, whose active management underperforms their declared benchmark portfolios. Balanced funds underperformed probably because they deviated from their investment policy. Transaction costs and other rebalancing frequencies do not change the conclusions. Robustness tests indicate that this evidence is valid out-of-the-sample. Investors can mimic balanced-fund policy and possibly do better by means of indexing according to this policy.     

Heterogeneity of Funds and Information Disclosure: Evidence

Institutional investors, especially public funds, play an important role in governing listed firms as they grow in Chinese stock markets. We classify each fund as “dedicated,” “transient,” or “mixed,” according to the concentration, turnover, and profit sensitivity of their stock holdings. We find that listed firms with more shares held by dedicated funds have a higher disclosure quality, while firms with more shares held by transient funds have a lower disclosure quality. These findings are consistent in different model settings. In addition, dedicated funds improve the disclosure quality of non-state-owned enterprises more than state-owned enterprises. Dedicated funds can benefit from the lower debt-financing cost and higher stock liquidity of firms with better disclosure quality.     

Is there a diversification “cost” of Shari’ah compliance? Empirical evidence from Malaysian equities

Islamic equity portfolios work with a smaller investment universe given the filtering of non-Shari’ah compliant stocks. It has been theoretically argued that this culminates in suboptimal portfolio diversification, which in turn adversely affects risk-adjusted returns. We offer empirical evidence that such a conceived portfolio diversification “penalty” is far from a foregone conclusion, at least empirically. Our results tend to indicate that Islamic portfolios are not invariably handicapped in terms of portfolio diversification. We also explored dimensions that may account for differences in the relative investment performance between Islamic and conventional portfolios, such as portfolio constraints, short selling and market conditions. We believe this paper is among the first to apply substantial empirical analysis specifically with respect to the portfolio diversification perspective on Islamic equity investments.     

Iterated VaR or CTE measures: A false good idea?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we consider different risk measures in order to determine the solvency capital requirement of a pension fund. Secondly, we illustrate the impact of the time horizon of long-term guarantee products on these capital. We consider a financial market modelled by a common Black–Scholes–Merton model. We neglect the mortality and underwriting risks by assuming that the pension fund is fully hedged against these risks, which allows us to keep understandable and tractable formulæ (the longevity risk will be a part of future researches). A portfolio is built in this market according to different strategies and the pension fund offers a fixed guaranteed rate on a certain time horizon. We begin with well-known static risk measures (value at risk and conditional tail expectation measures) and then we consider their natural dynamic generalization. In order to be time consistent, we consider their iterated versions by a backward iterations scheme. Within the dynamic setting, we show that solvency capital can be expensive and that attention must be paid to the safety level considered.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.